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I. INTRODUCTION
Imagine a situation that is every criminal defendant's worst nightmare.
An individual is accused of a federal offense and retains counsel to defend
him, entrusting his counsel with a great deal of confidential information nec-
essary to file pretrial motions and prepare the case for trial. However, unbe-
knownst to the accused, his attorney is himself a target in a federal investiga-
tion and is anxious to reach a favorable agreement with the government. In
order to do so, the attorney offers the government access to the most valuable
asset he possesses-namely, his access to his client. With the enthusiastic
agreement of the prosecutor, the attorney wears a recording device during his
meetings with his client, all the while continuing to represent him. Ulti-
mately, the information obtained through the government's electronic sur-
veillance of the attorney is used at his client's criminal trial, and is instru-
mental in securing his client's conviction.
This scenario may seem impossible given the sanctity traditionally af-
forded the attorney-client relationship in the United States-but this is exactly
what happened to Ronald Arthur Ofshe, a defendant in a federal narcotics
trafficking case in southern Florida.' Even more incredibly, despite the Elev-
enth Circuit's unequivocal condemnation of the prosecutor's tactic, Ofshe's
conviction was upheld-opening the door for the same stratagem to be used
by federal prosecutors throughout the United States. And, in fact, it has been
so used.
Beginning in the early 1980s, the use of attorneys as informants, whether
against their clients or their clients' associates, has shown a marked increase
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See United States v. Ofshe, 817 F.2d 1508, 1510-12 (1lth Cir. 1987) (detailing Glass' role as an
informant against Ofshe).
2 See id. at 1515-16. Although affirming Ofshe's conviction, the Eleventh Circuit stated that the
prosecutor's conduct was "reprehensible" and invited the district judge to refer the case on remand to
the attorney disciplinary commission. Id at 1516 n.6.
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as demonstrated by the number of reported decisions where this practice has
been at issue? Moreover, it is likely that many instances of attorney-
informants have gone unreported, as both prosecutor and defense attorney
have a strong incentive to conceal the existence of the attorney informant re-
lationship from the defendant. Thus, it is highly probable that the extent of
this problem is significantly underestimated if notice is solely by reports in
court decisions or in the news media.
As recently as 1991, the practice of "ratting,"" or using attorneys as in-
formants against their clients, was described as a "new arrow in prosecutors'
quiver,"' but this tactic has now persisted long enough to be regarded as an
established prosecutorial tool.6 The roots of the attorney-informant stratagem
are several, from a change in the nature of crimes commonly charged in fed-
eral courts,7 to a change in the attitude of federal prosecutors toward their
counterparts in the criminal defense bar.8 There can be little doubt that use of
defense attorneys as informants has become a significant source of informa-
tion for federal and state prosecutors. These contacts further involve ethical
considerations for both prosecutors and defense attorneys, especially since
they may be initiated by either.
Moreover, despite the courts' use of terms such as "sleazy,"
9 "reprehen-
sible," 0 " shocking,"11 and "bizarre" 1
2 to describe this prosecutorial strata-
gem, they have implicitly endorsed it bi affirming the great majority of con-
victions obtained through this method. By setting a standard so high that
only the most outrageous violations of the attomey-client relationship will be
punished, the courts have effectively given a green light to prosecutors to turn
attorneys against their clients, secure in the knowledge that the worst they will
3 See cases described in notes 26-105 infra and accompanying text. In Caddition, an unscientific
measurement of the scope of the attorney-informant problem, made by reviea'ing the Shepard's entry
for United States v. Qfshe, 817 F.2d 1508 (1lth Cir. 1987), which is generally regarded as the leading
case in this area, reveals more than 35 citations.
4 See generally Paul R. Tremblay, Ratting, 17 AiL J. TRIAL ADVOC. 49 (1993).
5 Robert Kuntz, NevArrow in Prosecutors' Quiver; Lmayers as Snitches: Ratting on Their Clien-
tele, LEGAL TMEs, Aug. 5, 1991, at 2 (stating that the use of attorney-informants. while a relatively
new practice, is on the increase); see also Max D. Stem & David Hoffman. Privileged Informers: The
Attorney Subpoena Problem and a Proposal for Reform, 136 U. PA. L REV. 1783. 1787 (1988) (de-
scribing the use of aggressive prosecutorial tactics against attorneys as a recent phenomenon fostered 
by
Justice Department officials during the Reagan Administration).
6 See Bill Moushey, Wrath of Vengeance: Prosecutors Take Aim at Defense Attorneys. PnrT.
PosT'-GAmzrE, Dec. 8, 1998, at Al (describing the increasing use of defense attorneys as informants
against their clients).
7 See id. (noting that "a series of get-tough-on-crime laws enacted during the 1980's has increased
the use of attorney informants).
8 See 1i1 (noting that new laws have made it easy for prosecutors to argue "that dfese attornzys
had illegally conspired with clients").
9 Tremblay, supra note 4, at 51 (citing United States v. Noons. Criminal No. H.89-92, at II (S.D.
Tex. Sept. 5, 1991)).
'0 ld. (citing United States v. Ofshe, 817 F.2d 1508.1516 n.6 (1lth Cir. 1987)).
" Id. (citing United States v. Marshank, 777 F. Supp. 1507 (N.D. Cal. 1991)).
12 1d (citing Marshank, 777 F. Supp. at 1522).
3 Id. (noting that most courts "permit the activity, but ruefully").
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receive is a verbal slap on the wrist.14 Furthermore, although Congress passed
the Citizens' Protection Act of 1998 in part to remedy abuses such as the use
of attorney-informants, subsequent legislation has eviscerated the protections
which the Act was intended to provide.
The use of attorneys as informants against their clients, especially in
criminal cases, has direct and profound constitutional implications. Courts
have found that the use of attorney-informants violates both the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel 6 and the Fifth Amendment right to due process
of law.'7 In addition, this practice has severe implications for the continued
viability of the attorney-client privilege and a lawyer's ethical obligation to
his client-areas which, although not of constitutional dimension in them-
selves, serve as important safeguards of constitutional protections."8
Accordingly, this Comment will examine the history and extent of the
use of attorneys as informants and will suggest means by which the courts
might go beyond verbal expressions of displeasure and respond meaning-
fully to this problem. Part H of this Comment will detail the history of
prosecutorial interference with the attorney-client relationship. Part I will
examine each of the constitutional rights affected by this intrusion, and the
stages of a criminal proceeding at which each applies. Part IV will analyze
the courts' response to this problem and set forth the reasons why that re-
sponse has been inadequate. Finally, Part V will suggest that courts should
combat the use of attorney-informants by using the doctrines of conflict of
interest and outrageous government conduct to dismiss indictments and by
seeking ethical and criminal sanctions against the attorneys who engage in
this practice.
II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF RATrING
The use of attorneys as informants against their clients is the latest in a
long series of methods used by prosecutors to undermine the relationship be-
tween a criminal defendant and his counsel. One of the early forms of this
interference occurred in 1952, when federal prosecutors recruited an indictee
to investigate a co-defendant, Bennie Caldwell, in exchange for leniency in
his own case." As a result, the informant became intimately involved in pre-paring the defendant's defense, and obtained information at defense meetings
which was later used in obtaining Caldwell's conviction in federal court.20 On
appeal, Caldwell's conviction was reversed, on the grounds that "high mo-
tives and zeal for law enforcement cannot justify spying upon and intrusion
14 See notes 189-217 infra and accompanying text.Is See notes 281-87 infra and accompanying text.16 See notes 135-60 infra and accompanying text.7 See notes 161-74, 178-83 infra and accompanying text.
s See notes 175-88, 214-17,253-74 infra and accompanying text.
19 See Caldwell v. United States, 205 F.2d 879, 880 (D.C. Cir. 1953) (holding that bribery convic-
tion must be overturned where government used informant to infiltrate attorney-client meeting).
20 Id. at 880.
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into the relationship between a person accused of a crime and his counsel."
21
In Weatherford v. Bursey however, the Supreme Court held that the gov-
ernment's interest in maintaining an informant's cover may justify allowing
the informant to attend defense meetings, as long as the informant does not
convey information from those meetings to the prosecutor.' In addition, the
Weatherford decision left important issues of law open to question, including
the degree of prejudice which must be proven by a defendant and the party
who carries the burden of proving that confidential information was or was
not used at trial, ' thus creating a considerable gray area in which prosecutors
could place "spies in the camp" of the defense. Despite the courts' condem-
nation of this practice, the number of reported decisions where such conduct
has been called into question demonstrates that attorney informants are fre-
quently used as a prosecutorial tool.2
In the 1980s, certain prosecutors began taking an additional step into the
attorney-client relationship. These prosecutors eliminated the middleman by
recruiting the defense attorney himself, rather than a co-defendant, as an in-
formant against his client. The first major case in which this occurred was
"Operation Greylord," a 1983 anti-corruption investigation which became the
central issue in the Eleventh Circuit case of United States v. Ofshe.26 In Op-
eration Greylord (" Greylord"), federal prosecutors targeted corruption within
the Cook County Circuit Court in Chicago, investigating court employees,
judges and attorneys who practiced before the court. One of Greylord's tar-
gets was a prominent Chicago criminal defense attorney named Marvin
Glass.?
At the time he learned that he was under investigation, Glass was engaged
in the representation of Ronald Arthur Ofshe, who was under indictment in
Miramar, Florida, for possession of cocaine with intent to distribute." In or-
der to forestall his own indictment under Greylord, Glass contacted federal
prosecutors in Chicago and offered to inform on the activities of his client,
Ofshe.3 In response, Assistant United States Attorney Scott Turow undertook
to have Glass wear a "body bug," or electronic recording device, and secretly
21 Id. at881.
429 U.S. 545 (1987).
See id. at 556-58 (holding that "[t
] here being no tainted evidence in this case, no communication
of defense strategy to the prosecution, and no purposeful intrusion [into the defense counsel's meetings
by the informant]," the informant's attendance did not violate the defendant's Sixth Amendment
rights).
24 See id. at 556 (noting only that "[a]s long as the information possessed by [the informantl re-
mained uncommunicated, he posed no substantial threat to [the defendant's] Sixth Amendment rights).
The Shepard's entry for the Weatherford case contains more than 500 citations across every fed-
eral appellate jurisdiction and numerous states. Since the "spy in the camp" issue was the only sub-
stantive issue addressed by Weatherford, the great majority of these cases involve the use of informants
to infiltrate meetings between criminal defendants and their attorneys.
26 817 F.2d 1508 (11th Cir. 1987).
27 See i. at 1511 n.2.
28 See id. at 1511.
29 Seei&. at 1510-11.
3 See id.
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record conversations with his client.3' Glass agreed to wear such a device, and
further agreed to conceal this agreement with his co-counsel, Mel Black. 2
Turow did not warn Glass to withdraw as counsel for Ofshe, nor did he seek
Glass' disqualification. As a result, Turow was able to maintain surveillance
over admittedly privileged communications for more than ten months, al-
though Turow testified that the government followed strict procedure so as
not to violate the attorney-client privilege. 3  Glass' surveillance of his client
only ceased when Black discovered his conduct and moved for dismissal of
the indictment against Ofshe on Fifth and Sixth Amendment grounds.? The
Eleventh Circuit concluded that Turow's actions were reprehensible and im-
plied that the Illinois Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commission
should investigate his conduct. 35 However, Ofshe's conviction was ultimately
upheld by the Eleventh Circuit, a decision regarded by prosecutors as a vindi-
cation of the practice of using attorneys as informants.36 Moreover, when it
was referred to the federal government, the Justice Department cleared Turow
of any wrongdoing. 7
In the same year, the Fifth Circuit considered another instance of the use
of a criminal defense attorney as an informant, also in a narcotics case. In
this case, James Hamage, a criminal defendant under indictment on drug
charges, retained a well-known Denver attorney named James Smith as his
counsel in late 1983 and paid a $1000 retainer fee.39 Smith himself, however,
was under investigation for possible involvement in drug trafficking, and-
like Glass-was recruited by federal authorities to act as an informant for the
government.' In that capacity, Smith provided to federal prosecutors a list of
names of people involved in cocaine trafficking.'" This list included the
names of two of Smith's clients-Hamage and his girlfriend, Linda Whit-
man. 2 Like Glass, Smith also wore a concealed recording device during
meetings with his client.43 As a direct result of information provided by
Smith, Whitman was approached by the government and told that she would
be indicted and arrested on drug charges unless she also cooperated with
31 See id. In addition to being a federal prosecutor, Turow is the author of ONE-L and PRESUMED
INNOCENT. See Kuntz, supra note 5, at 22 (describing Turow as a "celebrated novelist").
32 Ofshe, 817 F.2d at 1510-11 (summarizing the details of Ronald Ofshe's case).
33 See id.
34 See id. at 1512.
35 Id. at 1516 n.6 ("[W]e assume [the district judge] will refer this matter... for appropriate [disci-
plinary] action.").
See Kuntz, supra note 5, at 22. In 1986, the Supreme Court refused to hear the case. See United
States v. Ofshe, 817 F.2d 1508 (1987), cert. denied 484 U.S. 963 (1987).
See Tom Gibbons, Turow Acted Properly, Feds Decide, CHICAGO SUN-TIMES, Apr. 30, 1988, at
4 (qoting investigators as finding that "Turow's conduct was 'fully consistent with federal law."').
See United States v. Fortna, 796 F.2d 724 (5th Cir. 1986) (sustaining the defendants'-appellants'
convictions).
39 See id. at 727.
40 See id,
41 See id. (Smith identified approximately twenty persons whom he said could supply cocaine).
42 See id. (Smith at the time claimed Harnage was not a client).
43 See id. (reporting that Smith "wore a concealed tape recorder and traveled around Denver in a
vehicle with Hamage and others under FBI surveillance.").
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authorities.4' The information provided by Smith and Whitman ultimately led
to the conviction of Harnage and several others on charges of conspiracy to
import cocaine.45 Smith was ultimately disbarred for his unethical conduct
during his relationship with Hamage. 
4
Federal prosecutors' intrusion into the attorney-client relationship has ex-
tended both to current and former clients. In late 1984, the close friend and
former attorney of a suspected cocaine trafficker named Dario Arteaga intro-
duced Arteaga to a 'friend' who was purported to be interested in a drug
transaction. The 'friend' that wanted to purchase Arteaga's cocaine was an
undercover agent for the DEA, rather than a bona fide purchaser. ' Arteaga
was subsequently arrested and convicted. 9 His conviction was affirmed by
the Fifth Circuit
By the late 1980s, encouraged by the tepid response of the courts, prose-
cutors were pushing further and further into once-forbidden bounds. Possibly
the most egregious example is the prolonged investigation of Steven Mar-
shank, whose attorney acted as an informant against him and other clients
between 1986 and 1990.-" In 1986, Ronald Minkin, a criminal defense attor-
ney, approached federal prosecutors and struck a deal with them on behalf of
two clients who wished to provide information to the government in exchange
for immunity.' Minkin and these two clients met with federal prosecutors
and named Marshank-another of Minkin's clients in a divorce proceeding-
as a suspect in a major drug smuggling operation."
Subsequently, Minkin informed the government about the drug trafficking
activities of yet another client, Seth Booky.5' The government used this in-
formation to indict Booky and then offered him immunity in return for acting
as an informant against Marshank.Ss With Minkin's assistance, "Booky was
'wired' to record conversations with Marshank and engaged in other 'active
work' on the government's behalf." '
Throughout this time, as a federal judge later determined, prosecutors
were fully aware that Minkin represented "[two clients] who had provided
incriminating information about Booky and Marshank; ... [and] Booky him-
self, who was actively obtaining and providing incriminating information
See id. at 728 (Whitman signed an agreement to act as an informant in October of 1984).
45 See id. at 729 (noting that all charges dealt with acts done between January and April of 1985).
46 See People v. Smith, 778 P.2d 685 (Colo. 1989) (reporting that Smith received a two year suspen-
sion from the practice of law).
4' United States v. Arteaga, 807 F.2d 424, 425 (5th Cir. 1986) (holding that the use of a formtr at-
tomey as an informant did not violate due process).
4 See id. (Artega delivered cocaine to this agent over a few months).
49 See id. at 425.
4o See id. (holding defendant had not been entrapped).
51 See United States v. Marshank, 777 F. Supp. 1507, 1511 (N.D. Cal. 1991) (holding that the col-
laboration between the government and the defense attorney violated the defendant's Fifth and Sixth
Amendment right thereby requiring dismissal of the indictment).
n See i& at 1512.
53 See id
4 See id.
55 See id at 1512-13.
4 I at 1515.
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about Marshank."' 7 Moreover, Minkin told the government that, as Mar-
shank's long-time attorney, he would probably represent Marshank in up-
coming criminal proceedings and that Marshank could likely be convinced to
cooperate with the government." In fact, Minkin ultimately did represent
Marshank for a three-year period between his arrest and the ultimate dismissal
of his indictment, all the while providing information to the government about
his client. 9 Moreover, the government allowed Minkin and Booky to pres-
sure Marshank to pay Booky's "defense fees" in order to convince Marshank
that Booky was not an informant---and didn't make them return the money.6'
Marshank is one of the few reported instances where a criminal indict-
ment was actually dismissed due to the government's activities in using an
attorney as an informant against his client.6' While this case may thus repre-
sent a high-water mark of prosecutorial interference, it does not represent a
reversal or curtailment of the trend. As evidenced by subsequent decisions,
the practice has remained widespread and has even grown in scope.62
For instance, in 1990, Florida defense attorney Jose Manuel Insua "played
a key role in [federal prosecutors'] failed attempt to convict former state
Democratic Party leader Alfredo Duran of bribery and conspiracy." 63 In this
case, Insua was used to actively recruit Duran into accepting payment for
holding $12,000 in a fraudulent escrow account.64 Like the great majority of
other attorneys who inform on their clients, Insua himself was in legal trouble,
having agreed to plead guilty to importing more than five kilograms of co-
caine in 1988 and subsequently to act as an informant.65
At the same time, prosecutors were increasingly using the grand jury sub-
poena to coerce attorneys' testimony against their clients. According to sta-
tistics compiled by the American Bar Association and published in the New
York Law Journal, the number of subpoenas issued to attorneys by federal
prosecutors rose from approximately 420 per year during 1985-87 to 645 per
year between 1988 and 1990.66 Frequently, the subject matter of the subpoena
concerned an attorney's client or former client.67
One of the most celebrated cases in which an attorney was subpoenaed by
a grand jury involved radical defense lawyer Linda Backiel, who was subpoe-
naed to testify about the disappearance of her client Elizabeth Duke, a radical
activist.6 Backiel fought the subpoena in court on the grounds that it would
57 Id.
58 See id.
59 See id. at 1516-17.
60 Id. at 1515-16.
61 See id. at 1523-24, 1528, 1530 (dismissing indictments on Fifth and Sixth Amendment grounds).
6 See infra notes 65-104 and accompanying text (documenting the expansion of the practice).
63 Kuntz, supra note 5, at 2, 22.
64 Id. at 22.
6 Id.
66 See Robert G. Morvillo, When an Attorney is Subpoenaed, N.Y.L.J., June 4, 1991, at 3 (reporting
on the rift created between prosecutors and defense attorneys by the issue of subpoenaing client infor-
mation).
67 See id.
6S See In re Backiel, 906 F.2d 78 (3d Cir 1990) (upholding the finding of contempt against the at-
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require her to violate Pennsylvania Rule of Professional Conduct 1.6(a),
which provides in part that "[a] lawyer shall not reveal information relating to
representation of a client unless the client consents after consultation...."o
The subpoena, however, was ultimately upheld by the Third Circuit in 1990,
in a radical departure from prior case law. Prior cases generally held that at-
torneys may be subpoenaed to testify about their clients only when there is a
showing of vital, urgent and immediate need for unique knowledge." Even
after the Third Circuit's decision, Backiel still refused to testify concerning
her client and served six months for criminal contempt beginning in January
1991.*7 Her case received widespread attention in the media, including sym-
pathetic editorial comments that raised concern about prosecutorial over-
reaching.7
The most recent reported appellate decision to consider the problem of
lawyer-informants is United States v. Voigt7 ' decided by the Third Circuit in
1996. The defendant in that case, John Voigt, devised and implemented an
elaborate scheme to defraud loan applicants and investors "by inducing them
to pay substantial 'advance fees' for nonexistent loans and investments." ' To
implement this scheme, Voigt created a fraudulent trust with fictitious ties to
the Catholic Church and the Knights of Malta.76 In order to administer the
trust, Voigt employed an attorney by the name of Mercedes Travis 7
According to the record, Travis testified that she became concerned about
the legitimacy of the trust during the summer of 1991, and accordingly, she
approached the FBI with her concerns.' At an interview with the FBI, Travis
provided documents indicating that the trust was engaged in a fraud? At the
same meeting, Travis denied that she had been appointed an attorney for the
trust and insisted that a letter purporting to appoint her as such was false!"
tomey for refusing to cooperate with a grand jury).
See PA. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDUCT 1.6(a); see also Monroe Freedman. When Keeping
Secrets Becomes a Crime, TEX. LAWYER, Jan. 21, 1991, at 22 (describing the Barkiel case and stating
that "[t]he phrase 'relating to representation' is intended to be read literally. Thus, the lawyer's obliga-
tion to withhold information about a client goes far beyond the more limited evidenatiy attomey-cfient
evidentiary privilege.").
70 See Backiel, 906 F.2d at 94 (remanding to allow Backiel to make a refusal in public and then
commence contempt hearings in open court).
71 See, e.g., In re Terkeltoub, 256 F. Supp. 683, 686 (S.D.N.Y. 1966) (refusing to compel a witness
to give grand jury testimony that he claimed was protected by attomey-client privilege).
See Jailed Lawyer Wa/ks, NAT'L LJ., June 24, 1991, at 6. 18 U.S.C. § 3691 is the federal statute
which authorizes courts to impose summary punishment for certain criminal contempts.
7See, e.g., Dale Davenport, Cheers and Jeers, HARRISBURG PATRIOT, Jan. 5, 1991. at A10 (prais-
ing Backiel and condemning prosecutorial overreaching).
74 89 F.3d 1050 (3d Cir. 1996).
7s Id. at 1060.
76 See id.
77 See id. at 1061.
7See id. Although, under Disciplinary Rule 4-101(C). attorneys may inform authorities of clients'
plans to commit future crimes, this does not authorize the subsequent use of the attorney to further in-
vestigate the client. See United States v. Sabri, 973 F. Supp. 134, 145.46 (W.D.N.Y. 1996).
"See Voigt, 89 F.3d at 1061.
See id. Travis conceded that she worked for the Trust in 1990, but claimed that she had not
served it in a legal capacity. See id
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In the hope of gaining further information, FBI agents then "devised a
pretext whereby Travis would reingratiate herself with the Trust by falsely in-
forming Voigt that she had negotiated [a financial agreement]."' As part of
this pretext, Travis agreed to record conversations with administrators of the
trust, including Voigt.2 The scheme was successful in that Voigt once again
asked her to become the trust's attorney.3 At this point, Assistant United
States Attorney Paul Zoubek warned her of the danger of conflict of interest
and stated that she could not act as a government informant in her capacity as
trust attorney.84 At the same meeting, however, her FBI contact requested that
she 1provide information about the financial assets of the Trust, which she
did. In addition, Travis was not taken off the books as a government infor-
mant until several months later, and the government used information she
provided through allegedly unsolicited telephone calls to the FBI.86  Travis
herself was ultimately indicted but was acquitted; Voigt was convicted and
sentenced to 188 months of incarceration. 7 Voigt's conviction, like the vast
majority of convictions obtained through the use of attorney-informants, was
upheld.8
At the same time that the Voigt case was under consideration in the Third
Circuit, the Western District of New York decided the case of United States v.
Sabri.89 The Sabri case, which is the most recent district court decision to
consider the practice of attorney-informants at the time of this writing, is
unique because the government used an attorney representing an individual in
a civil matter to investigate him on related criminal charges. The defendant
in this case, Zafar Sabri, was a Pakistani immigrant who was the subject of
deportation proceedings instituted by the Immigration and Naturalization
Service (" INS").9' He retained an attorney, Bonnie Crogan-Mazur, to repre-
sent him at a hearing before the immigration judge who was considering his
case.
92
81 See id.
8 See U at 1062-
See id Travis acted only to facilitate communications initially, but later was appointed as full
attorney for the Trust. See id.
84 See id. The FBI informed Travis that any time spent working for the Trust would not be as a
government informant, due to potential privilege difficulties. See id.
See id. Travis provided information that the Trust had sufficient funds to cover its existing loan
commitments. See id.
88 See id. at 1062-63. Travis called to inform the agent of the Trust's insufficient funds and Travis'
own representation of only the Trust in two grand jury subpoenas. See id.
See id at 1060 (convicting Voigt of one count of conspiracy to commit wire fraud, fourteen
counts of wire fraud, four counts of money laundering, two counts of tax evasion, and criminal forfei-
ture arising out of the money laundering counts).
s See id at 1096.
89 973 F. Supp. 134 (W.D.N.Y. 1996) (finding that the government's exploitation of an attorney's
relationship with her client was outrageous and violated the defendant's due process rights).
90 See id. at 139 (stating that "[t]he parties have not cited, and the Court has not found, a similar
case in which the government enlisted an attorney representing an individual in on-going civil pro-
ceedings to actively use the attorney-client relationship to investigate and obtain evidence against that
individual for use in a criminal prosecution").
91 See id. at 137.
9 See id.
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Subsequently, during a telephone conversation with Crogan-Mazur, Sabri
stated that he held the INS responsible for "causing problems for him for 13
years of his life," and threatened to retaliate with violent action in order to
send a political message." Specifically, he "explained] that change only oc-
curs in America in response to 'something like Oklahoma City,'" referring to
the bombing of a federal office building in Oklahoma City in 1995 that had
killed 168 persons. ' He further stated that he had "a focused plan that is go-
ing to cause change.... Killing 50 to 100 people... now that is a statement
that people will have to be alerted to."" Sabri and Crogan-Mazur further dis-
cussed that "killing for a good cause is not considered a bad thing in some
cultures." 96
Understandably disturbed by this conversation, Crogan-Mazur contacted
the immigration judge and the INS trial counsel responsible for Sabri's case
and informed them of his threat The INS counsel brought FBI investigators
into the case, and asked Crogan-Mazur to tape a subsequent telephone con-
versation with Sabri while continuing to act as his attorney in the immigration
proceeding? Approximately eight days after the initial threatening state-
ments were made, Sabri again telephoned Crogan-Mazur and made further
threats toward government officials, which Crogan-Mazur recorded on tape.?
Upon a subsequent motion to dismiss, Sabri was granted partial relief-
the charges based upon the second conversation, but not the first, were dis-
missed." However, as demonstrated above, even this partial degree of relief
is rarely granted to defendants who are informed upon by their attorneys.
Although there are no reported appellate decisions since Sabri that directly
address the attorney-informant problem, there is also no indication that this
practice has abated. Rather, commentators have recently indicated that de-
fense attorneys have become one of the primary targets of the prosecution,
and that use of lawyer-informants is one of the major tools employed for that
purpose.1O1
Proponents of "ratting" are few, and generally limited to the prosecutors
who foster the practice. '02 Even the courts that have affirmed convictions ob-
tained through ratting have nevertheless expressed their disapproval of the use
' Id. at 137-38. Sabri blamed the INS for his inability to leave the country to visit his dying father
in Pakistan and wished to tell the INS judge of his resulting "heartache." I.
9 I!. at 138 (reporting the defendant's statement that "[n]o one listens to an)thing unless there is
violence").
95 I.
96d.
97 See id.
9' See id.
99 See id. Several of Sabri's statements were identified as the basis for the charge in a Bill of Par-
ticulars. IC.
19 See id. at 147-48.
01 Moushey, supra note 6, at Al (reviewing three recent cases where prosecutors targeted defense
attorneys who had become entangled with their clients).
102 See e.g., Kuntz, supra note 5, at 22 (quoting former federal prosecutor Scott Turow as defending
use of attorney-informants because "[y]ou can't have a relationship which is sacrosanct from investiga-
tion").
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of attorneys to investigate their cients.' ° Moreover, the proponents of the use
of attorney-informants often base their reasoning on factors that are at odds
with practical experience. For instance, Professor H. Richard Uviller-who
supports the use of attorneys as informants-has suggested that a defense at-
torney who "visits the client's warehouse in the course of preparing a defense
in a case of tax evasion and while there learns [of] ... a major drug smuggling
operation" might permissibly inform the government of his clients' drug traf-
ficking activities. However, as another commentator has pointed out, the
case law contains no instances of "noble ratting" in the interests of justice."z '
Rather, as the discussion above demonstrates, the great majority of cases that
do not involve coercion by subpoena involve attorneys who were themselves
under investigation and acting out of motives of self-preservation. Accord-
ingly, the proponents of "ratting" rest their defense at best on a shaky foun-
dation.
Why, then, is the use of attorney-informants so prevalent? One reason
may lie in the changing nature of the offenses commonly prosecuted in fed-
eral court. One commentator quotes a Justice Department official as saying:
Twenty-five years ago, federal prosecutors did interstate car theft and bank
robberies ... The bad guys were bank robbers, and that was the level of so-
phistication of the prosecutions .... Now we're doing continuing-criminal-
enterprise cases and money-laundering cases. Wherever there's that kind of
money, there are lawyers involved in the underlying transactions. They're
buying shopping centers for people who made money in a criminal enterprise.
They're legitimate targets.'06
In other words, more attorneys have come under investigation for federal
crimes, and thus there is a larger pool of attorneys who might be induced to
become informants.1 °0 Moreover, attorneys may become informants either
103 See supra notes 9-12 and accompanying text (calling the practice of attorney-informants sleazy,
reprehensible, shocking and bizarre).
104 H. Richard Uviller, Presumed Guilty: The Court of Appeals Versus Scott Turow, 136 U. PA. L.
REv. 1879, 1893 (1988).
105 Tremblay, supra note 4, at 54. Since the authorship of Professor Tremblay's article in 1993,
however, the case of United States v. Sabri, 973 F. Supp. 134 (W.D.N.Y. 1996) (described supra note
89 and accompanying text) was decided, involving an attorney who voluntarily approached government
investigators out of concern that her client might commit terrorist acts. See id at 137-38. This attor-
ney, who was not under investigation by the government or under any other apparent motivation to
curry favor, might arguably have engaged in "noble ratting." The Voigt case might also arguably con-
stitute an instance of "noble ratting," as there are indications that attorney Mercedes Travis may have
gone to the FBI voluntarily out of her concern for victims of fraud. See United States v. Voigt, 89 F.3d
1050, 1060-61 (3rd Cir. 1996). However, Travis' ultimate status as a co-defendant, combined with the
fact that she returned to work for Voigt's Trust despite her knowledge of its fraudulent activities, id. at
1061-63, suggest that she had no ethical objection to earning money through fraud and that her primary
desire was to ingratiate herself with the government in the event of indictment. In any event, the rarity
of noble ratting among the reported decisions that concern attorney-informants provides strong evi-dence that the great majority of such instances are motivated not by concern for potential victims but for
the attorney's own well-being.
106 Kuntz, supra note 5, at 2. For examples of statutes which have been used to expand the scope of
federal criminal liability, see 18 U.S.C. § 1956 (money laundering); 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68 (racketeer-
ing) 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (mail fraud).For examples of attorneys who have recently been convicted of crimes, see Ronald Gift Mullins,
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proactively or reactively. That is, they may be recruited by federal authorities
or may alternatively approach prosecutors on their own initiative.
Another reason is the change in the nature of federal prosecutorial offices.
As one commentator recently pointed out, the past ten to fifteen years have
seen an increase in the number of Assistant United States Attorneys who are
"'career" prosecutors with no private-sector experience to temper their zeal."
Thus, as one former federal prosecutor asserts, "the philosophy of the past 10
years is that whatever works is all right." o9 In addition, federal prosecutors in
recent years have much greater financial resources to use in recruiting andmaintaining informants, and political considerations have often demanded the
increased use of informants in order to obtain high-profile convictions."
0
In addition, the "Thornburgh Rule," under which federal prosecutors are
not required to obey state ethical rules, has freed Assistant United States At-
torneys from the ethical shackles which might have constrained their use of
attorney-informants in an earlier time."' This rule, which was codified in
1995 by an act of Congress and only recently repealed,"
2 provides not only
that federal prosecutors need only follow the Justice Department's internal
ethical rules but that they may only be disciplined by the Justice Department
itself.113 Thus, the Thornburgh Rule, prior to its appeal, has effectively insu-
lated federal prosecutors from any independent oversight and left the policing
of their ethical standards entirely to their own agency. This rule has, for in-
stance, allowed federal prosecutors to ignore state ethical rules under which
failure to report another attorney's ethical violation may itself be disci-
plined' 4 Thus, federal prosecutors could encourage a defense attorney to en-
Defendants Say Insurance Bureau Unconstitutional, J. OF COM., Jan. 8, 1999, at 9A (noting two attor-
neys on trial for insurance fraud); Harvey Burgess, Couple to Testify in Loomis Trial, IlE HERAL
(Rock Hill, S.C.), Jan 5, 1999, at 5A (discussing attorney on trial for money laundering in connection
with attempt to assist clients in hiding their ill-gotten gains); Ju., Convicts Laiser of Medicare Fraud,
MIAM HERALD, Jan. 28, 1999, at 2 (discussing an attorney convicted of fraud).
10 See Bill Moushey, Out of Control: Legal Rules Have Cianged, Allowing Federal Agents, Prose-
cutors to Bypass Basic Rights. PrIT. POSr-GAZETrE, Nov. 22, 1998, at Al; see also Stem & Hoffman,
supra note 5, at 1787 (describing increased use of aggressive tactics by federal prosecutors beginning
during the Reagan administration).
"9 Prosecution or Persecution? If Justice Won't Clean Up Its Act, Congress Should. PnTT. POST-
GAZETE, Dec. 13, 1998, at B2 [hereinafter Prosecution or Persecution] (summing up Moushey's in-
vestigative report on abuse and law breaking by prosecutors).
110 See id.; see also generally BENNETr GERSHMAN. PRosEctrromiAL MiscoNDucr (1998) (de-
scribing history and varieties of prosecutorial misconduct prevalent in the United States).
II See Prosecution or Persecution, supra note 109, at B2; see also Rory K. Little. Who Should
Regulate the Ethics offederal Prosecutors?, 65 FORDHAM L REV. 355. 357-59 (1996) (describing the
Thomburgh rule); Harvey Berkman- "Thornburgh Rule" Law?, NAT'L LJ., Mar. 20. 1995. at A6
(same).
112 See Iltte, supra note 111. at 357. This codification may have come in response to the decision
of the District of Columbia Circuit in United States v. Ferrara, 847 F. Supp. 964 (D.C. Cir. 1993), in
which the District of Columbia Circuit held that the Thornburgh Rule was a mere Justice Department
policy which could not be regarded as federal law, and that the New Mexico state disciplinary board
could therefore initiate proceedings against a federal prosecutor who communicated ex parte with a
defendant without the knowledge or consent of his counsel.
1
3 See generally Little, supra note I 11.
"' See Kuntz, supra note 5, at 2, 22 (discissing federal prosecutors' use of defense attorney Jose
Manuel Insua, who negotiated an agreement in which he pled guilty to importing cocaine, as an infor-
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gage in conduct amounting to a conflict of interest by diminishing the fear
that their behavior will subject them to disbarment or suspension.
This change in the character of federal prosecutorial offices has brought
with it a change in attitude under which prosecutors have increasingly viewed
defense attorneys as co-conspirators with their clients rather than as fellow
members of the bar." 5 Specifically, some prosecutors are becoming increas-
ingly frustrated in their attempts to fight crime, and have come to see the at-
torneys of their targets as their enemies."6 Moreover, many prosecutors have
come to view defense attorneys not only as "'enemies"' but as criminals.
According to one commentator, many federal prosecutors believe that defense
attorneys must "[get] into bed with their clients" in order to prepare a defense
in a complex narcotics or money-laundering case."7 Since federal prosecutors
increasingly view criminal defense attorneys as no different from criminals,
they treat defense lawyers as they would their clients-by trying to recruit
them as informants."'
A related view held by at least some prosecutors is that criminal defen-
dants, or at least those who are accused of certain offenses, do not really de-
serve the assistance of counsel. For instance, one federal prosecutor has de-
fended the use of forfeiture proceedings against legal fees in narcotics cases,
stating that he "hope[s] it... [has a chilling effect] on attorneys.... When
attorneys decide to make a living off narcotics dealers, that's their prob-
lem." "9 In other words, this prosecutor apparently believes that accused nar-
cotics dealers do not deserve to retain counsel and, further, that their attorneys
are knowing co-conspirators in narcotics dealing.
This attitude harks back to the opinion of Judge Julius Hoffman, ex-
pressed during the trial of the Chicago Seven, that the wide availability of
lawyers in the United States explained the unrest in the country 2' However,
modem prosecutors have tools which were unavailable in Judge Hoffman's
time in order to give effect to his opinion. For instance, broad-sweeping laws
such as the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO)"'
and expanded interpretations of mail and wire fraud and money laundering
statutes have resulted in an increasing number of prosecutors alleging that at-
mant).
Hs See id. at 22 ("[W]e're doing continuing-criminal-enterprise cases and money-laundering cases.
Wherever there's that kind of money, there are lawyers involved.... They're legitimate targets."); see
also Peter L. Zimroth, When Defense Goes Begging, NAT'L L.J., June 25, 1990, at 14 (stating that
"[miore and more, we are seeing government officials treating defense counsel not as a shield between
the government and the individual, but rather as an unnecessary obstruction to speedy justice which
must be removed, or, more insidiously, as an instrument of government that should be used to further
the government's investigatory or prosecutorial goals").
See Timothy S. Robinson, Targeting Lawyers, NAT'L L.J., Jan. 21, 1985, at 1, 26 ("[Mlany
prosecutors [believe] that attorneys are playing an increasing role.., in allowing criminal activity to
flourish.").
117 Moushey, supra note 6, at Al (quoting William Aronwald, a former federal prosecutor).M See Kuntz, supra note 5, at 2 (discussing the "recruitment of lawyers as snitches").19 Robinson, supra note 116, at 27.
1 See David Rudovsky, The Right to Counsel Under Attack, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 1965, 1965 (1988)
(paraphrasing Judge Hoffman).18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68.
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torneys are co-conspirators with their clients.a Increases in sentencing, in-
cluding harsh mandatory minimum sentences in many narcotics cases, have
combined with these statutes to render defense attorneys vulnerable to long
prison terms for conspiracy and, thus, vulnerable to being turned into infor-
mants.
In addition, courts have become more sympathetic to subpoenas which
compel attorneys to provide records or to testify concerning a client before a
grand jury."n Moreover, statutes requiring disclosure of cash transactions
have frequently been used to require attorneys to become de facto informants
against their clients in money laundering cases." Courts have also adopted
an increasingly strict standard of proof for allegations of ineffective assistance
of counsel, including proof of conflict of interes
t."' This has led in turn to in-
creasing acceptance of representation of multiple clients by a single attorney
in criminal cases, which poses the risk that an attorney might seek to gain le-
niency for one client by informing on another.
'26
The use of attorneys as informants is in fact part of a trend involving such
diverse elements as fee forfeitures'. and subpoenas's which has the collective
effect of undermining the attorney-client relationship in criminal cases.'
Many commentators within and without the criminal defense bar see this pat-
tern as no accident but rather, as a calculated effort on the part of federal
prosecutors to undermine the effectiveness of criminal defense attorneys.
" a
According to one commentator,
[i]t may not have started out as a grand design... [b]ut clearly the Department
of Justice now recognizes that all these things in combination are having the
intended effect of making lawyers less a part of the system, of driving a wedge
between lawyers and clients, of making lawyers less able to represent their cli-
131
ents.
BI. CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES RAISED BY ATrORNEY-INFORMATS
The use of criminal defense attorneys as informants against their clients
implicates three separate constitutional considerations. First, and most obvi-
ously, use of attorney-informants undermines their clients' Sixth Amendment
122 See Moushey, supra note 108, at Al.
1 Compare In re Terkeltoub, 256 F. Supp. 683 (S.D.N.Y. 1966) (quashing subpoena of attorney in
absence of a compelling need greater than the need for privacy and conlidentiality) with In re Backiel.
906 F.2d 78 (3d Cir. 1990) (upholding subpoena of an attorney despite lack of showing of compclling
neld See Robinson, supra note 116. at 26 (describing IRS cash transaction reporting requirements).
,2 See inftra notes 133, 135-56 and accompanying text.
'2 See supra notes 50-60 and accompanying text (describing the facts of the hfarshawk case).
'27 See United States v. Monsanto, 491 U.S. 600, 611-14 (1989) (stating that forfeiture statute does
not contain an exemption for property used to pay attorney).
'28 See generally Stem & Hoffman, supra note 5.
129 See Kuntz, supra note 5, at 2 ("These are people you do not talk to unless you'd be happy telling
the Feds the same thing." (quoting an anonymous Florida defense attorney))..
13 See id.; see also Moushey, supra note 6. at Al.
131 Kuntz, supra note 5, at 22 (quoting Neal Sonnett, past president of the National Association of
Criminal Defense Lawyers).
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right to effective assistance of counsel. 32 Second, this practice implicates the
Fifth Amendment right to due process of law. 33  Finally, use of lawyer-
informants jeopardizes the attorney-client privilege, which is not a constitu-
tional right in itself but is of constitutional dimension as it safeguards defen-
dants' rights under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments.' This section will out-
line the broad parameters of each of these constitutional rights.
A. Sixth Amendment
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that "in
all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right... to have the as-
sistance of counsel for his defense." 35 In the landmark case of Strickland v.
Washington,'36 the Supreme Court recognized that the Sixth Amendment right
to counsel necessarily implied the right to effective assistance of counsel.'37 In
Strickland, the Court also established a two-part test to determine whether a
defendant's right to effective assistance of counsel has been violated.' First,
a defendant must show that his attorney's performance was significantly be-
low professional norms.'39 Second, he must demonstrate that the "deficient
performance prejudiced the defense." "' In this instance, prejudice is defined
as a "reasonable probability" that the outcome of the defendant's trial would
have been different but for the unprofessional errors of his counsel."''
In certain limited circumstances, however, prejudice is presumed under
the Sixth Amendment. One of these areas is conflict of interest. Since the
Sixth Amendment includes "the right to be represented by counsel whose
loyalties are undivided," 142 representation by an attorney whose loyalties are
divided is presumptively prejudicial.' 3 This was specifically recognized by
the United States Supreme Court in Strickland, which stated that:
[When an actual conflict of interest exists,] counsel breaches the duty of loy-
alty, perhaps the most basic of counsel's duties. Moreover, it is difficult to
measure the precise effect on the defense of representation corrupted by con-
flicting interests. Given the obligation of counsel to avoid conflicts of interest
and the ability of trial courts to make early inquiry in certain situations likely to
132 See U.S. CONST. amend. VI; see also Strickland v. United States, 466 U.S. 668, 692-94 (1986)
(stating that a defendant's right to effective assistance of counsel is compromised when a defendant is
prejudiced); Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 350 (1980) (stating a conflict of interest adversely af-
fecting a client's lawyer's performance violates the Sixth Amendment).
133 See U.S. CONST. amend. V; Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 169 (1952) (stating that due pro-
cess is violated when "the cannons of decency and fairness" are offended (citations omitted)).
134 See infra notes 171-84 and accompanying text.
'3' U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
13 466 U.S. 668 (1983).
137 See id. at 687-96.
138 See id. at 687.
139 See id. at 687, 690.
140 Id. at 687
1l1I at 695; see also Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 434 (1995) (explaining that "reasonable
probability" is shown when confidence in a trial's outcome is undermined).142 United States v. Partin, 601 F.2d 1000, 1006 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 964 (1980).
143 See Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 349-50 (1980).
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give rise to conflicts.., it is reasonable for the criminal justice system to
maintain a fairly rigid rule of presumed prejudice for 
conflicts of interesL
t "
Thus, in cases where an actual conflict of interest exists, a criminal defendant
is required to prove only that the attorney was actively representing conflict-
ing interests and that the conflict "adversely affected" specific instances of
counsel's performance. 41 In such cases, there is no need for the defendant to
establish a reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial would have
been different if no conflict of interest had existed.1'
Courts have recognized that a conflict of interest may exist, not only be-
tween co-defendants, but between an attorney and his client. For instance, in
United States v. Ellison 47 the Seventh Circuit considered a case where the de-
fendant sought to withdraw a guilty plea because his attorney persuaded him
to forgo trial, despite the defendant's protestations of innocence, because he
"did not want to make waves with the federal prosecutors with whom he
would be working in the future."'
The district court had held a hearing concerning the defendant's allega-
tions, but did not appoint new counsel; instead, the same attorney continued to
represent the defendant at the hearing, even though he also gave testimony
adverse to his client's allegations."4 9 The Seventh Circuit held that this
amounted to a Sixth Amendment violation, because the defense counsel
"acted as both counselor and witness for the proscution""a and thus fulfilled
"inherently inconsistent" roles.15' Moreover, the court held that since the de-
fendant made allegations that would amount to malpractice on the part of the
attorney if true, the attorney's interests were directly in opposition to those of
his client at the hearing."' Therefore, where actual conflicts of interest exist
between an attorney and his client, the rule of presumed prejudice is as appli-
cable as where the conflict is between two clients represented by the same at-
torney.9
The Sixth Amendment may also be violated by government intrusion into
the attorney-client relationship04 In contrast to the effective assistance of
'" Strickland, 466 U.S. at 692.
'4 Culer, 446 U.S. at 348-50; see also Freund v. Butterworth, 165 F.3d 839. 858-60 (11th Cir.
1999) (applying the Cuyler standard and finding that "adverse effect" required proof of (1) a "plausi-
ble" alternative strategy, (2) the fact that the strategy would have been reasonable, and (3) a link be-
tween the actual conflict and his lawyer's failure to employ the alternative strategy); Malonz v. Cal-
deron, 167 F.3d 1221, 1222 (9th Cir. 1999) (staying execution due to existence of substantial issue
under Cuyler).
"' See Freund, 165 F.3d at 858-60
17 798 F.2d 1102 (7th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1038 (1987).
" Id. at 1106.
149 See id
" Id. at 1107.
I' d.
" See id.; see also Mathis v. Hood, 937 F.2d 790, 796 (2d Cir. 1991) (finding actual conflict of
interest in lawyer's representation of defendant during appeal where defendant filed a grievance against
his attorney with disciplinary committee prior to appeal).
0 See United States v. Soldevila-Lopez, 17 F.3d 480, 486 (1st Cir. 1994) (stating that it is "well
settled" that an actual conflict may be shown where an attorney acted in his own interest).
'4 See United States v. Ofshe, 817 F.2d 1508, 1516 (11th Cir. 1987) (stating that the Fifth Amend-
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counsel standard, which focuses on the conduct of defense counsel, the non-
governmental intrusion standard focuses on the actions of the government. In
United States v. Morrison,' the Supreme Court set forth a standard similar to
the Strickland test for ineffective assistance of counsel by which to determine
such claims. 56 In order to establish a Sixth Amendment violation based upon
government intrusion into the attorney-client relationship, a defendant must
show that the government's actions violated the Sixth Amendment and that he
was actually prejudiced.' 57 At least one circuit has gone beyond Morrison to
adopt aper se rule that intentional intrusions into a defendant's attorney-client
relationship violate the Sixth Amendment and constitute reversible error.'58
This rule, however, has not been adopted by a majority of other circuits,'59 al-
though a number of appellate and district courts have suggested that no
showing of prejudice is necessary in cases where the government intrudes
upon the attorney-client relationship deliberately and without legitimate pur-
pose.
B. Fifth Amendment
The Sixth Amendment right to counsel has additional limitations that im-
pact upon a defendant's right to effective representation at certain stages of a
criminal proceeding. Most importantly, the Sixth Amendment right to coun-
sel attaches only upon the filing of formal criminal charges and ceases to op-
erate at the conclusion of a criminal proceeding. 6' Accordingly, the Due Pro-
cess Clause of the Fifth Amendment provides a defendant's right to an
unimpaired relationship with his counsel at the investigatory stage of a case.6"
Due process of law is summarized as a constitutional guarantee of respect
for those "personal immunities which are... 'so rooted in the traditions and
conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental.'" Certain viola-
tions of a suspect's pre-arraignment right to counsel, such as failure to inform
him of his right to an attorney upon being taken into custody as well as before
interrogation, have been held to be per se violations of the Fifth Amend-
ment.'6 In addition, the Fifth Amendment has been invoked in order to seek
ment may be violated where the government's use of criminal defense attorneys "shock[s] the universal
sense of justice").155 449 U.S. 361 (1981).
15 See id. at 364-67.
157 See id. at 364-65.
158 See United States v. Levy, 577 F.2d 200,210 (3d Cir. 1978).
159 See, e.g., United States v. Schwimmer, 924 F.2d 443, 447 (2d Cir. 1991) (requiring prejudice
even for intentional intrusion into attorney-client relationship); United States v. Steele, 727 F.2d 580,
586-87 (6th Cir. 1984) (same).
See, e.g., Shillinger v. Haworth, 70 F.3d 1132, 1142 (10th Cir. 1995) (establishing per se rule of
reversible error upon proof of intentional intrusion into attorney-client relationship where the state does
not have a legitimate law enforcement purpose for its intrusion).
161 See United States v. Marshank 777 F. Supp. 1507, 1518-19 (N.D. Cal. 1991).162 See id.
163 Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 169 (1952) (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97,
105 (1934)).
164 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436,474 (1966).
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dismissals of criminal cases based upon "outrageous government conduct"
that violates a defendant's right to due process of law.
The outrageous government conduct defense was first suggested in 1952
in the case of Rochin v. California.'6s In his concurring opinion, Justice
Douglas argued that a court may dismiss an indictment when the conduct of
law enforcement agents is so outrageous that due process principles would ab-
solutely bar the government from invoking judicial processes to obtain a con-
viction.'6 This concept of due process stems from the objective approach to
entrapment cases, in which the government's over-involvement in criminal
activity may violate a defendant's Fifth Amendment rights. 7 However, the
vagueness of the standard that the Supreme Court has outlined for this defense
has meant that, despite frequent invocation of the defense of outrageous gov-
ernment conduct, convictions have rarely been reversed on this ground.'o
The Supreme Court has twice addressed the parameters of the outrageous
government conduct defense, in United States v. Russell'* and Hampton v.
United States.170 In both of these cases, the Court recognized the existence of
the defense but urged that it be reserved for only those cases that most
shocked the conscience of the court.77 As a result, this defense has often been
denied even in cases where the government acts deceptively or where it pro-
actively participates in a crime that it is investigating."" Rather, the chal-
lenged conduct must be shocking, outrageous and clearly intolerable,' such
as when the government contacts a minor criminal and effectively provides
him with the equipment, contacts and money necessary to become a major
narcotics trafficker.'74 Accordingly, due to the lack of clear standards and the
Supreme Court's warning dictum in Hampton, the outrageous government
conduct defense has become, for most purposes, a defense that exists only in
theory.
C. Attorney-Client Privilege
Another protection of the attorney-client relationship is the evidentiary
privilege that exists for confidential communications between an attorney and
his client.7 5 This privilege belongs to the client, cannot be waived by the at-
165 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
166 See id. at 177-78 (Douglas, J., concurring).
167 See generally Erich Weyand, Comment, Entrapment: From Sorrells to Jacob.on-The Dz'elop-
ment Continues, 20 OIO N.U. L. REv. 293 (1993) (outlining the development of the entrapment de-
fense).
167 See United States v. Santana, 6 F.3d 1, 4 (lst Cir. 1993) ("The banner of outrageous misconduct
is often raised but seldom saluted.").
169 411 U.S. 423 (1973).
170 425 U.S. 484 (1976).
171 See id. at 488-91.
,7 See United States v. Orena, 145 F.3d 551,561 (2d Cir. 1998) (upholding denial of motion to dis-
miss based on alleged "outrageous government conduct" where FBI agent secretly provided informa-
tion to a government informant to assist him in criminal activities within an organized crime family).
1 See; e.g., United States v. Mosley, 965 F.2d 906,910 (10th Cir. 1992).
174 See e.g., United States v. Twigg, 588 F.2d 373 (3d Cir. 1978).
175 The attorney-client privilege is the oldest of common-law privileges, existing prior to th cstab-
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torney,' and survives even the death of the client.'" Accordingly, the attor-
ney-client privilege is the most far-reaching of the rights that safeguard confi-
dential attorney-client communications, extending to former as well as current
clients. Thus, the primary weapon against attorneys who inform on former
clients is not the direct protection of the Fifth or Sixth Amendments but the
attorney-client privilege.
This privilege, which is not specifically mentioned in the Constitution, is,
strictly speaking, an evidentiary privilege rather than a constitutional right.'
However, because the Sixth Amendment has been held to guarantee the pri-
vacy of communications between a criminal defendant and his counsel,' the
privilege-at least in criminal cases-safeguards a constitutional right."W
Thus, despite the protestations of many prosecutors-including former Inde-
pendent Counsel Kenneth Starr-that the attorney-client privilege is not a
constitutional right, 8' a number of courts have held that this privilege is of
constitutional dimension when invoked in the context of a criminal prosecu-
tion.' Several commentators have also argued that "the sixth amendment
right to counsel, when read together with the fifth amendment's protection
against forced self-incrimination, makes the attorney-client privilege a con-
stitutional imperative." 3
The attorney-client privilege, however, is subject to a number of excep-
tions, including the" crime-fraud" exception, which applies when the conver-
sation between client and attorney is in furtherance of ongoing crime, fraud or
lishment of the United States. See Stem & Hoffman, supra note 5, at 1796. The authoritative pro-
nouncement on the scope of the attorney-client privilege, which is still used by American courts, was
made in Professor Wigmore's classic treatise on evidence: the attorney-client privilege attaches:
(1) Where legal advice of any kind is sought (2) from a professional legal advisor in [the advi-
sor's] capacity as such (3) the communications relating to that purpose (4) made in confidence
(5) by the client (6) are at [the client's] insistence permanently protected (7) from disclosure by
himself or by the legal advisor (8) except the protection be waived.
8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2292 (1961) (footnote omitted); see also In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces
Tecum, 731 F.2d 1032, 1036 (2d Cir. 1984) (using the Wigmore definition).
176 See In re Application of Sarrio, 119 F.3d 143, 147 (2d Cir. 1997).
17 See Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 524 U.S. 399 (1998) (stating that over a century's worth of
case law demonstrates that the attorney-client privilege survives the client's death).
178 See Lynne D. Boylston, Note, Attorneys' Fees and the Money Laundering Control Act of 1986:
Further Erosion of Criminal Defense Advocacy, 21 GA. L. REV. 929,938 (1987).
179 See United States v. Rosner, 485 F.2d 1213, 1224 (2d Cir. 1973) ("the essence of the Sixth
Amendment is... privacy of communication with counsel.").
19 See Boylston, supra note 178, at 938.
1 See Lisa E. Toporek, Comment, "Bad Politics Makes Bad Law": A Comment on the Eighth Cir-
cuit's Approach to the Governmental Attorney-Client Privilege, 86 GEo. L.J. 2421, 2425-26 (1998)
(stating that Independent Counsel Kenneth Starr argued before the Supreme Court that the attorney-
client privilege was not constitutionally based).
1 See, e.g., Coplon v. United States, 191 F.2d 749, 759-60 (D.C. Cir. 1951) (finding that "the ac-
cused does not enjoy the effective aid of counsel if he is denied the right of private counsel with him");
Geoffrey C. Hazard, An Historical Perspective on the Attorney-Client Privilege, 66 CAL. L. REv. 1061,
1062 (1978).
1 Stem & Hoffman, supra note 5, at 1806 (citing Michael Rosenfeld, The Transformation of the
Attorney-Client Privilege: In Search of an Ideological Reconciliation of Individualism, the Adversary
System, and the Corporate Client's SEC Disclosure Obligations, 33 HASTINGS L.J. 495, 510-11 & n.89
(1982) (citing authority for the constitutionalization of the attorney-client privilege)).
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misconduct' This exception, in the case of attorney-informants, has often
swallowed the rule, because prosecutors have often regarded it as a green light
to recruit attorneys to inform on their clients, even regarding matters on which
the attorney is currently representing the clienL "s As one commentator has
stated, " [u]se of the crime/fraud exception by prosecutors... 'skyrocketed'
[beginning in the mid-1980s]," assisted by federal courts' broad construction
of the exception.'" Thus, the crimefraud exception further weakens the pro-
tections of the attorney-client privilege,' and creates an environment in
which prosecutors may frequently claim that their use of attorney-informants
is legitimate because the crime/fraud exception effectively negated the defen-
dant's attorney-client privilege.""
IV. THE COURTS' RESPONSE TO ATfORNEY-INFORMANTS
The federal courts have almost uniformly condemned the use of criminal
defense attorneys as informants against their clients.'t At the same time,
however, the judiciary has effectively condoned this conduct by refusing to
sanction prosecutors and defense attorneys who engage in such behavior ex-
cept in the most egregious of circumstances. This section details the manner
in which the courts' focus on prejudice toward the defendant and the courts'
refusal to apply ethical rules and conflict of interest standards has effectively
placed a judicial imprimatur on the use of attorney-informants despite verbal
condemnation of the practice.
A Outrageous Government Conduct and the Attorney-Informant
Only two published decisions exist in which an indictment has been dis-
missed due to outrageous government conduct in utilizing an attorney as an
informant,' 9 and the circumstances of these cases illustrate the difficulties in
applying this defense to lawyer-informant situations. The first of these cases
is the egregious violation of the attorney-client relationship which took place
1 See, e.g., United States v. Horvath, 731 F.2d 557,562 (8th Cir. 1984) (holding that the facilitation
of"an ongoing criminal conspiracy" did not warrant strict confidentiality).
19 See David . Fried, Too High a Price for Truth: The Exception to the Attorney-Client Privilege
for Contemplated Crimes and Frauds, 64 N.C.L REV. 443. 446 (1986) (concluding that -the exception
has been abused and distorted, above all in the service of federal prosecutors, to the point where th,
attorney-client privilege has been seriously eroded"); Stem & Hoffman, supra note 5. at 1797 (stating
that the crime-fraud exception "has substantially eroded the scope of attorney-client privilege").
196 Stem & Hoffman, supra note 5, at 1800-01 (describing the low hurdles set by courts which en-
able prosecutors to invoke crime-fraud exception on a frequent basis).
See id at 1800-01.
ts See i. (stating that the crime-fraud exception has a "tendency... to swallow up the rule of at-
torney-client privilege altogether").
"9 See supra notes 9-12 and accompanying text.
190 See United States v. Sabri, 973 F. Supp. 134, 147 (W.D.N.Y. 1996) (concluding "that the gov-
ernent's conduct as to Count II of the indictment is outrageous...."); United States v. Marshank, 777
F. Supp. 1507, 1524 (N.D. Cal 1991) (dismissing the indictment because the govemmnt's conduct
"was so outrageous that it shocked the universal sense ofjustice").
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in United States v. Marshank.1 91 In Marshank, the court noted that evidence
obtained through Marshank's counsel was "used against [him] at every turn"
during a period of three years, that "the government's misconduct... was de-
signed to and would give the prosecution an unfair advantage at trial," and
that the federal prosecutors' conduct went far beyond "'passive tolerance' of
impropriety" creating a "complete lack of respect for the constitutional rights
of the defendant." 92 Accordingly, based upon the totality of the circum-
stances, the court dismissed the indictment.'93
Similarly, in United States v. Sabri,94 the court granted partial dismissal of
the indictment against the defendant on the grounds that "the government's
manipulation of the attorney-client relationship... is offensive to the princi-
ples which underlie our criminal justice system."' 95 Specifically, the court
gave great weight to the fact that the defense attorney, at the government's in-
stigation, "used the [attomey-client] relationship to initiate communications
with the defendant, exhort him to be frank and not hold back.., and then di-
rected the conversation to the topic of his previous comments about vio-
lence."'9 In other words, the government proactively abused the trust be-
tween attorney and client not only to investigate a crime, but to create an
additional crime. Noting that alternative means of investigation such as
wiretaps and surveillance were available to the government, the court deter-
mined that the existence of such egregious circumstances mandated dismissal
of the charges obtained through the use of the attorney-informant.)'
In other cases, however, the outrageous government conduct defense has
not been successful. In the Arteaga case, for instance, the Fifth Circuit fo-
cused upon the conduct of the defendant, holding that "[a] defendant who ac-
tively participates in the crime may not avail himself of the defense." 98 Thus,
despite the fact that the outrageous government conduct defense focuses upon
the behavior of the government rather than the defendant, the Fifth Circuit ap-
plied a standard of predisposition similar to the traditional entrapment de-
191 See Marshank, 777 F. Supp at 1511. The facts of Marshank are described supra in notes 50-60
and accompanying text.
I Id. at 1521, 1524 (citing United States v. Simpson, 813 F.2d 1462, 1468 (9th Cir. 1987) (noting
that "the government's passive tolerance" here of a private informant's questionable conduct "[was]
less egregious" than the conscious direction of government agents typically present in outrageous con-
duct cases.).
193 See Marshank, 777 F. Supp. at 1524 (dismissing the indictment "[b]ecause the government's
conduct was fundamentally unfair").194
973 F. Supp. at 137. The facts of Sabri are fully set forth supra in notes 88-99 and accompanying
text.
195 Id. at 147.
196 Id.
1 See id. The court determined, however, that dismissal of the first count of the indictment was not
warranted, as this count stemmed from statements made by the defendant to his attorney prior to her
involvement with the government. See id. at 146-47 (concluding that the government's conduct "as it
relates to Count I is [not] outrageous or improper in any way."). Thus, the attorney's actions at that
time are not attributable to the government and cannot be categorized as prosecutorial misconduct. Id.
Moreover, the court found that the attorney's disclosure of these statements to the government was
proper, as an attorney is allowed "to reveal the confidences of a client who intends to commit a crime."
Id. at 144 (citing MODEL RULEs OFPROFESSIONAL CNDUc DR 4-101(c)(3) (1983)).
193 United States v. Arteaga, 807 F.2d 424,427 (5th Cir. 1986).
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fense.19 Likewise, in United States v. Fortna, ° the Fifth Circuit dismissed
James Harnage's outrageous government conduct claim on the ground that
"[the government must often rely on those in close relation to the defendant
to infiltrate criminal operations.""' Thus, the government's intrusion into a
legally sanctioned relationship based upon trust cannot form the foundation of
an outrageous government conduct defense, at least within the Fifth Circuit.
The difficulties with the outrageous government conduct defense are best
demonstrated by the Third Circuit's decision in United States v. Voigt." In
Voigt, the Third Circuit held that a defendant cannot establish outrageous
government conduct "premised upon the deliberate intrusion into the attor-
ney-client relationship" unless "the defendant can point to actual and sub-
stantial prejudice."'  Such prejudice can only be demonstrated when: (1) the
government is objectively aware of an ongoing attorney-client relationship
between the defendant and the informant; (2) the government deliberately in-
trudes into the attorney-client relationship; and (3) an "actual and substantial
prejudice" analogous to that required under Strickland is created.m' Thus, the
Third Circuit injected a requirement of prejudice towards the defendant into a
defense that focuses primarily on the objective outrageousness of the govern-
ment's conduct. In fact, under the Voigt standard, a defendant cannot obtain
dismissal, no matter how outrageous the conduct of federal prosecutors, un-
less he can prove that his trial was affected by the government's behavior.
This standard would make it virtually impossible to win pretrial dismissal
based on government use of attorney-informants, and would render even post-
trial claims difficult top rove due to the demanding harmless error standard
used by federal courts.
199 See i To support its conclusion, the Arteaga court cited Justice Rehnquist's plurality opinion in
United States v. Hampton, 425 U.S. 484 (1976). which stated that a criminal defendant cannot win dis-
missal of an indictment due to government misconduct unless he was entrapped. See Artega, 807 F.2d
at 426 (noting that "the due process clause forbids the government to act improperly even against cul-
pable persons" (citing Hampton, 425 U.S. at 488-89). However, in Hampton, Justice Rehnquist spoke
for only three Justices in his plurality opinion. Both Justice Powell's separate concurrence and Justice
Brennan's dissent, which collectively spoke for five Justices. endorsed the proposition that the outra-
geous government conduct defense is available regardless of predisposition. See id. at 495 n.7 (Powell.
L, concurring) (noting that police involvement that reaches "a demonstrable level of outrageousness
might bar conviction); i at 497 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (supporting "a bar to conviction... where
the conduct of law enforcement authorities is sufficiently offensive..."). The majority of the Hamp-
ton court thus recognized a defense based on objectively outrageous government conduct which is ap-
plicable regardless of the defendant's predisposition to commit the crimes with which he is charged.
See also United States v. Luttrell, 889 F.2d 806, 811 (9th Cir. 1989) (noting that the outrageous gov-
ernment conduct defense does not depend upon lack of predisposition); State v. Lively. 921 P.2d 1035.
1048-49 (Wash. 1996) (reversing conviction on ground of outrageous government conduct despite ear-
Her rejecting entrapment defense due to evidence of predisposition).
2M 796 F.2d 724 (5th Cir. 1986).
:0 Id at735.
89 F.3d 1050 (3d Cir. 1996).
Id at 1066.
M Id.
=5 See Fed. R. Crim. Pro. 52(a) (defining harmless error as "[a ]n y error, defect, irregularity or vari-
ance which does not affect substantial rights ... ").
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B. The Sixth Amendment and the Attorney-Infonnant
Sixth Amendment arguments have likewise been substantially ineffective
in combating prosecutorial use of attorney-informants. This is largely due to
the fact that, except in cases involving actual conflict of interest, the defendant
is required to demonstrate prejudice arising from the Sixth Amendment viola-
tion. Thus, in the seminal case United States v. Ofshez °' the Eleventh Cir-
cuit declined to find reversible error because no evidence of prejudice result-
ing from taped conversations between Ofshe and his attorney was admitted at
trial.an Likewise, in Voigt, the Third Circuit declined to reverse despite its
prior holding that deliberate intrusion into the attorney-client relationship was
per se reversible error, because the intrusion was not aimed at the procure-
ment of "confidential defense strategy." ' Again, only in Marshank was the
government's intrusion into the attorney-client relationship found sufficient to
constitute reversible error under the Sixth Amendment.1
These rulings are deficient in several respects. First, the Ofshe court's fo-
cus on particularized prejudice is inapplicable in the context of an attorney-
informant, as confidential information gained from defense attorneys can of-
ten lead prosecutors to additional valuable evidence. Thus, the court failed to
consider that the information disclosed to the prosecutor by Ofshe's attorney
might have led prosecutors to other incriminating evidence which was used at
trial and which would not have been located but for the attorney's coopera-
tion.
Second, decisions such as Ofshe and Voigt fail to take into account the
possibility of conflict of interest, which does not require a showing of preju-
dice. In Ofshe, the defense attorney entered into a cooperation agreement
with the government, agreeing to disclose information in return for immunity
or leniency for his other clients.21' Thus, the attorney was representing his
own interests, in addition to Ofshe's, during the pendency of Ofshe's criminal
prosecution. Since those interests were inimical to those of Ofshe, a conflict
of interest existed and prejudice should therefore have been presumed under
the Cuyler standard.212 In fact, in any case where an attorney enters into a co-
operation agreement with the government, he is arguably representing his
See supra notes 133-56 and accompanying text.
817 F.2d 1508 (11th Cir. 1987).
See id. at 1515 (noting that "Ofshe suffered no prejudice as a result of the taped conversation.").
2M Voigt, 89 F.3d at 1071 (noting that "[t]he record in this case demonstrates that the government
was scrupulous in its effort to avoid procurring confidential defense strategy.").
210 See United States v. Marshank, 777 F. Supp. 1507, 1525 (N.D. Cal. 1991) (holding that, "the
government's collaboration with [the defendant's attorney] in the investigation, arrest and prosecution
of the defendant. .. circumvented and diluted the protections guaranteed to the defendant by the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel.").
21 See Ofshe, 817 F.2d at 1511 (noting that the defendant's attorney provided the government with
information about "several former and present clients," including the defendant, in order to "diminish
his own criminal responsibility").
2 See Cathy Bradl Peterson, Defense Attorneys as Government Informants: Strangers in a Strange
Land?, 5 GA. ST. U. L. REv. 619, 629 (1989) (noting that "[the validity of [S]ixth [A]mendment attor-
ney conflict of interest claims is judged by the Supreme Court's standard enunciated in Cuyler v. Suli-
van ").
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own interests and should therefore be regarded as engaging in a conflict of
interest per se with any client upon whom he is providing information to the
government!
t 3
C. The Attorney-Client Privilege and the Latnyer-Infonnant
Invocation of the attorney-client privilege in cases involving lawyer-
informants is also difficult, both because of the crime-fraud exception and the
requirement that the information disclosed must relate to the matter for which
the attorney was retained! ' Thus, in Ofshe, the defendant's claim of attor-
ney-client privilege was denied because the information collected by his law-
yer was in furtherance of ongoing crime and was used in a different investi-
gation from that for which he had retained counsel.' t Similarly, in Arteaga,
an attorney was allowed to inform against a former client because the matters
concerning which he provided information did not concern the case for which
he had been previously retained.216 Only in the case of James Hamage did a
court remand the issue of an attorney-informant for a hearing as to whether
the attorney-client privilege had been violated, and only because issues of fact
existed as to whether the communications recorded by his attorney were con-
fidential.
217
Thus, the high bar set by the courts in all three of the areas commonly im-
plicated by the use of attorney-informants creates a nearly insurmountable
hurdle to the reversal of convictions based upon this unethical conduct. Ac-
cordingly, prosecutors are free to use defense attorneys as informants against
their clients, secure in the knowledge that their conduct will not endanger the
convictions they obtain and that the maximum sanction they face is an inef-
fectual verbal slap on the wrist from the judicial system. Thus, the courts'
tepid response to the problem of attorney-informants and their failure to pur-
sue creative solutions has led to an environment in which "ratting" by de-
fense attorneys is judicially tolerated or even tacitly encouraged.
V. A STRONGER RESPONSE TO ATTORNEY-INFORMANTS
The widespread and growing intrusion into the relationship between
criminal attorneys and their clients necessitates a strong and unequivocal re-
sponse. In many respects, the courts have had difficulty formulating this re-
sponse due to the fact that established constitutional and statutory doctrines
213 But see i. at 629 (asserting that "[t]he Culer standard mandates an actual conflict of interest
resulting in the attorney's adverse performance").
214 See Tremblay, supra note 4. at 78.
215 See Ofhe, 817 F.2d at 1515.
216 United States v. Arteaga, 807 F.2d 424, 427 (5th Cir. 1986) (holding that "it is also not outra-
geous to use an informant who previously served the defendant as an attorney on commercial matters").
217 United States v. Fortna, 796 F.2d 724, 742 (5th Cir. 1986) (withholding judgment on whthar an
indictment should be quashed because an attorney gave the government information he had learned
"pursuant to the attorney-client relationship").
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are often inadequate to address the problem at hand."'8 Thus, at least part of
the response must come from the agencies which set the rules by which the
criminal justice system operates--the legislature and professional disciplinary
boards.2' However, it is also possible, within the current legal framework, for
the courts to fashion a more effective response to the use of attorney-
informants through creative use of established principles.' This section will
outline several means by which professional associations, legislatures and the
courts may work together to formulate a comprehensive response in order to
prevent the Sixth Amendment right to an effective criminal defense from be-
ing further undermined.
A. Expanding the Fifth Amendment to Address
the Attorney-Informant Situation
Constitutional interpretation is within the unique province of the judici-
ary.?' Thus, it is within the power of the courts to reinterpret existing Fifth
Amendment doctrines in order to more adequately address the growing prac-
tice of prosecutorial use of attorney-informants. This could be accomplished
by one of two methods.
The first method would be to establish a category of Fifth Amendment
violation, separate from the realm of outrageous government conduct, which
is established when a prosecutor knowingly allows a defense attorney to in-
form on a client, former client or potential client. This has been done with re-
gard to other situations involving a defendant's right to counsel; for instance,
the famous case of Miranda v. Arizona" implemented a procedural rule to
protect a suspect's Fifth Amendment right to be informed of his right to coun-
sel upon being taken into custody.m Although a Miranda violation does not
normally fall into the category of "outrageous government conduct," it was
felt by the Supreme Court to be sufficiently important to securing a defen-
dant's right to due process of law to be protected by judicial sanction.2" Since
a client's right to communicate with his attorney and receive effective repre-
sentation is a similarly important aspect of the adversarial criminal justice
system, it would make sense to hold that intrusion into this right by prosecu-
218 See supra text accompanying notes 185-207.
219 See, e.g., Richard Klein, Legal Malpractice, Professional Responsibility and Representation of
the Indigent Defendant, 61 TEMP. L. Rnv. 1171, 1174 (1988) (stating that legislatures of every state but
California adopted the ABA Model Rules of Professional Responsibility soon after their promulgation).
The sources of ethical rules may include professional associations such as the ABA, state legislatures,
or disciplinary boards. See id.; see generally Mark Tuft, Trial Publicity-Before, During and After
Trial, 537 PLI/LIT 7, *24 (1995) (describing how the California state legislature passed resolutions
instructing the state bar association-which is normally responsible for enacting disciplinary rules-to
enact a rule regulating trial publicity and sexual relations between attorneys and their clients).
See infra text accompanying notes 215-268.
n2 See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 524 (1997) ("The power to interpret the Constitution
in a case or controversy remains in the Judiciary.").
2n 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
W See id. at 474.
U4 Id.
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tors is a presumptive violation of the Fifth Amendment.'
This would, of course, require a change in existing law. Even within the
framework of current law it is still possible to address the problem of attor-
ney-informants through fuller and more expansive use of the outrageous gov-
ernment conduct defense. Since the Supreme Court has not set a clear stan-
dard concerning the threshold of outrageous government conduct,
2 6 lower
courts have considerable freedom, within the law as it currently exists, to de-
termine that knowing prosecutorial intrusion into the attomey-client relation-
shigviolates this standard At least two district courts have in fact done
so; others, however, have been handicapped by their focus on predisposition
and prejudice to the defendant rather than the conduct of government offi-
cials. If the courts were to apply the outrageous government conduct de-
fense as it is intended to be applied---as a sanction for flagrant government
misconduct regardless of the practical effect upon the defendant--they
would possess a much more powerful weapon with which to control prose-
cutorial abuse of the attorney-client relationship23'
See Stem & Hoffman, supra note 5, at 1825 (stating that " [t]he centrality of the attomey-client
relationship in our criminal justice and adversary systems derives from both constitutional and common
law sources."); see also Meredith B. Halama, Loss of a Fundamental Right: The Sixth Amendment as a
Mere "Prophylactic Rule", 1998 U. ILL L REV. 1207. 1230-42 (1998) (noting that attorney-client
communication is of fundamental importance to safeguarding Sixth Amendment rights).
See, e.g., Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484, 487-90 (1975) (holding that the government
did not violate a defendant's due process when the defendant was convicted of heroin distribution to
government agents, heroin which was given to the defendant by a government informant).
2 See United States v. Marshank, 777 F. Supp. 1507, 1523 (N.D. Cal. 1991) (holding that the gov-
ernment's collaboration with the defendant's attomey while the defendant was being investigated and
prosecuted violated the defendant's Sixth and Fifth Amendment rights); see also United States v. Sabri.
973 F.Supp. 134, 146-47 (W.D.N.Y. 1996) (dismissing an indictment due to the defendant's attorney
recording conversations with her client and the government's abusive manipulation of the attorney-
client relationship).
See id.
See United States v. Voigt, 89 F.3d 1050, 1070 (3d Cir. 1996) (noting that the court will not ad-
dress the issue of outrageous government conduct unless the defendant makes a showing of prejudice).
See supra text accompanying note 195; see also Stephen A. Miller, The Case for Preserving the
Outrageous Government Conduct Defense, 91 N.W.U. L REV. 305, 312-26 (1996) (arguing that the
outrageous government conduct defense should properly focus upon the government's due process
violations rather than the defendant's predisposition to commit the charged offense because othervise it
would simply duplicate the already-existing entrapment defense).
231 In the event that a court is concerned with the adverse impact on society which would result from
the outright dismissal of the charges against a defendant accused of serious offenses, it could impose the
lesser sanction of suppressing evidence found to have been obtained through outrageous government
conduct. Although the Eighth Circuit in United States v. Shny, 94 F.3d 438, 442 n.5 (8th Cir. 1996).
noted that the ordinary remedy sought in outrageous government conduct cases was dismissal and
questioned whether the remedy of suppression was appropriate, other courts have entertained motions
to suppress under this doctrine. See United States v. Bouchard, 886 F. Supp. 111. 114 (D. Me. 1995)
(evaluating motion to suppress evidence allegedly gained through outrageous government conduct).
Moreover, the Supreme Court has stated that the "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine "excludes evi-
dence obtained from or as a consequence of lawless official acts." Costello v. United States. 365 U.S.
265, 280 (1961). Accordingly, a court would be within its authority to sanction prosecutors by suppres-
sion of evidence gained through the use of an attorney-informant rather than dismissing the indictment
outright. Of course, in cases which depend entirely upon illegally obtained evidence, suppression is
tantamount to dismissal. See Sabri, 973 F. Supp. at 139 (considering motions to suppress evidence and
dismiss indictment together, as evidence obtained from attorney constituted sole evidence in case). In
Apr. 20001
JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL L4W
B. Sixth Amendment
It is also possible to achieve greater control over the use of attorney-
informants under current Sixth Amendment jurisprudence. This, as with pos-
sible Fifth Amendment solutions, may be accomplished in several ways.
First, the courts may adopt the Third Circuit precedent of United States v.
Levy,232 under which an intentional government intrusion into the attorney-
client relationship constitutes reversible error even absent a showing of preju-
dice to the defendant. 3 Moreover, other circuits should adopt the Levy doc-
trine without the gloss put upon it by the Third Circuit in Voigt, under which
the concept of knowing intrusion is limited to attempts to discover defense
strategy rather than attempts to obtain confidential information for use at
trial
.2
Second, courts may enforce the Sixth Amendment through a more vigor-
ous interRretation of the conflict of interest doctrine as outlined in Cuyler v.
Sullivan. S Common sense dictates that an attorney who is under investiga-
tion and is negotiating a plea or cooperation agreement with the government
is representing his own interests. If this attorney is also providing information
about a client, then his interest in defending himself against the investigation
is directly at odds with the interest of his client. Detailed analysis is not nec-
essary to demonstrate that it is difficult, if not impossible, for an attorney to
adequately and vigorously represent a client about whom he is providing in-
criminating information. Accordingly, any such situation should be regarded
as an actual conflict of interest, and continued representation of a client by an
attorney-informant should thus constitute reversible error without a showing
of prejudice.' In fact, such a conflict of interest should be presumed when-
ever an attorney is used as an informant after the government learns of his
confidential relationship with his client, regardless of whether the initial ap-
proach is made by the prosecutor or the defense attorney himself. Thus,
courts would be able to provide an appropriate sanction for the use of attor-
ney-informants without having to create a new Sixth Amendment right.
C. Attorney-Client Privilege
A more expansive reading of the traditional attorney-client privilege is
also necessary in order to eliminate or curtail the use of attorney-informants.
This is necessary because the "crime-fraud" exception to the privilege has
many or even most cases, however, prosecutors would be able to continue to pursue the charges against
the defendant, albeit without being able to introduce evidence gained through their illicit intrusion into
the attorney-client relationship.
232 577 F.2d 200 (3d Cir. 1978).
23 See id at 210.
See Voigt, 89 F.3d at 1070.
446 U.S. 335 (1980).
Z%6 See Peterson, supra note 212, at 629-30 (noting that in such situations, prejudice is presumed and
does not have to be shown).
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become an exception which swallows the rule in the case of prosecutorial in-
trusion into the attorney-client relationship.2 In many cases, prosecutors
have read the crime-fraud exception as blanket permission to enlist attorneys
as informants with regard to ongoing investigations or even to induce defense
attorneys to solicit their clients to commit crimes.?"
The necessary solution is to restrict the crime-fraud exception to future
crimes which are unrelated to any matter for which the attorney is currently
retained. Although the interests of justice may be served when an attorney
reports a client's intention to commit an unrelated offense, any future offense
which is related to the matter for which counsel has been retained is too in-
tertwined with the attorney's representation of the client to be a safe subject of
disclosure. In this situation, there is great danger that, while ostensibly dis-
closing information about future criminal plans, the attorney will inadver-
tently or deliberately disclose information about past offenses for which he
has been engaged to represent the client. Only if the crime-fraud exception is
restricted to unrelated matters will the defendant's constitutionally derived
right to communicate confidentially with his attorney be adequately safe-
guarded.
D. Supervisory Power of the Court
A fourth legal doctrine which may be utilized to control the problem of
attorney-informants is the inherent supervisory power of the court. The su-
pervisory power, which has been recognized by the Supreme Court,
7 may be
used in the sound discretion of the trial judge and is not dependent on the ex-
istence of reversible error under an established legal standard. Rather, the su-
pervisory power may be used "(1) to remedy a violation of a statutory or con-
stitutional right; (2) to preserve judicial integrity; and (3) to deter future illegal
onduc 4
t 1
The supervisory power was invoked by the Northern District of California
in United States v. Marshank to dismiss an indictment in a case where an at-
torney-informant had been used, on the grounds that "[t]he supervisory power
has frequently been used by federal courts as a means of sanctioning and de-
terring prosecutorial misconduct. 2 Specifically, the court cited two grounds
in its invocation of the supervisory power to dismiss the indictment against
2n See supra notes 184-188 and accompanying text.
23 See id.
2 See United States v. Sabri, 973 F. Supp. 134, 148 (W.D.N.Y. 1996) (describing the Court's su-
pervisory power and noting that it is limited and intended to be used on rare occasions).
See e.g., United States v. Hale, 422 U.S. 171, 180 n.7 (1975) "[Whm... . evidentary matter
has grave constitutional overtones.., we feel justified in exercising this Court's supervisory controL")
(citations omitted); Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449, 455-56 (1957) (holding that a confession
obtained through misconduct is not admissible); Mesarosh v. United States, 352 U.S. 1. 14 (1956)
(finding that a court may use its supervisory power to reverse a conviction based on false evidence).
2'" United States v. Marshank, 777 F. Supp. 1507, 1528 (N.D. Cal. 1991) (citing United States v.
Simpson, 927 F.2d 1088, 1090 (9th Cir. 1991)); see United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499,505 (1983)
(discussing the supervisory power of federal courts).= 777 F. Supp. at 1529.
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Marshank: "the need to remedy the violation of the defendant's constitu-
tional rights and to deter future government misconduct."2 3 In addition, the
court noted that "[j]udicial integrity is severely threatened when professional
ethical and court rules such as those involved here are flouted by the govern-
ment." 
2"
Similarly, the Western District of New York in Sabri invoked the supervi-
sory power of the court in granting partial dismissal of the indictment against
the defendant.24 Citing Marshank, the court determined that "the govern-
ment's manipulation of the attorney-client relationship, even those relation-
ships which relate to civil matters, may have profound implications upon the
nature of the attorney-client relationship and the integrity of the judicial proc-
ess." 2" Accordingly, the court found that use of the supervisory power was
appropriate because "[tihere is no need to add to the challenges of our crimi-
nal justice system, or to increase the public's distrust, by making it permissi-
ble for lawyers to act in concert with the government to investigate their own
clients."24'7 Moreover, while noting that invocation of the supervisory power
ordinarily required prejudice to the defendant M the Sabri court held that such
prejudice could consist merely of improper manipulation of the attorney-client
relationship2U
Thus, a court may use its supervisory power to condemn the practice of
using attorney-informants even if the facts of a particular case do not support
dismissal under an established rule of law. In addition, two judicial com-
ments on the supervisory power render it especially applicable in cases where
criminal attorneys are prevailed upon to inform on their clients. First, the Su-
preme Court has noted that punishment of improper conduct by federal attor-
neys is a proper use of the supervisory power." Thus, federal prosecutors-
who are often beyond the reach of other disciplinary authorities-may prop-
erly be sanctioned by this method. Second, in determining whether to exer-
243 Id.
U4 Id. at 1530. The court specifically noted that defense attorney Ron Minkin, who had acted as a de
facto agent of the government, had violated Rule 3-310 of the Rules of Professional Conduct of the
State Bar of California, providing that "[a] member shall not concurrently represent clients whose in-
terests conflict, except with their informed written consent." Id at 1529. Moreover, the court noted
that the Northern District of California had adopted the California state disciplinary rules as court rules,
so that a violation of the rules of professional responsibility was also a violation of the rules of court.
Id. at 1530.
245 See United States v. Sabri, 973 F. Supp. 134, 148 (W.D.N.Y. 1996) ("It is settled... that super-
visory power to dismiss an indictment, although extremely limited, does exist.").
M4 Id.
247 I
M See kL The author cites Bank of Nova Scotia v. United States, 487 U.S. 250, 254 (1988), reason-
ing that the government's conduct must be flagrant and prejudice the defendant in order to warrant use
of the supervisory power.
249 See id. It should be noted that courts have also used their supervisory power to regulate the issu-
ance of grand jury subpoenas to attorneys, an issue related to the use of attorney-informants. See Stem
& Hoffman, supra note 5, at 1807-14 (stating that courts have used their supervisory power both to
quash subpoenas on an ad hoc basis and to establish rules requiring prior judicial approval for issuing
subgenas to attorneys).
See United States v. Hale, 422 U.S. 171, 181 (1975) (invoking its supervisory power by reversing
the trial court and granting defendant a new trial).
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cise the power, "[c]ourts have looked to whether there is a pattern of similar
government misconduct, on the theory that such widespread misconduct in-
creases the threat to judicial integrity."2 Since numerous commentators have
noted a widespread and growing trend toward the use of attorney-
informants, the supervisory power is particularly appropriate to curtailment
of similar abuses in the future. Thus, increased use of the supervisory power
will afford courts a means, within current law, to create an appropriate sanc-
tion for prosecutorial misuse of the attorney-client relationship even where the
facts of a case cannot be made to fit within one of the recognized areas of re-
versible error.
E. Ethical Sanctions
The final manner in which the use of attorney-client communications may
be controlled is through the use of ethical sanctions." This is the area where
the legislature and disciplinary boards may contribute the most to a solution of
the lawyer-informant dilemma, as the creation and enforcement of ethical
rules is frequently within their exclusive province!"
Ethical rules are not themselves constitutionally mandated, but often serve
as important safeguards of constitutional rights. As the Second Circuit stated
in United States v. Hammad:5 "[tihe Constitution defines only the 'minimal
historic safeguards' which defendants must receive rather than the outer
bounds of those we may afford them. In other words, the Constitution pre-
scribes a floor below which protections may not fall, rather than a ceiling be-
yond which they may not rise." 6 The Model Code of Professional Respon-
sibility was described in Hamnad as playing a role in this system by
"safeguard[ing] the integrity of the profession and preserv[ing] public confi-
dence in our system ofjustice."2
The relationship between ethical rules and the Constitution can thus be
analogized to the traditional Jewish legal concept of "placing a fence around
the law. "' This concept, first articulated by the twelfth-century philosopher
Moses Maimonides, 9 holds "that restraints and prohibitions should be in
place to prevent us from reaching, or at least impede our progress toward, the
point of absolute and damning transgression. There should at least be safety
2" United States v. Marshank. 777 F. Supp. 1507, 1530 n.17 (N.D. Cal. 1991).
See supra Part IL
2 See Sabri, 973 F. Supp. at 143-46 (holding that ethical violations by defense attormeys require
dismissing Count II of an indictment against a defendant); Marshank 777 F. Supp. at 1529 (citing eLhi-
cal violations by defense attorney as basis for dismissing indictment).
See supra note 219 and accompanying text.
858 F.2d 834 (2d Cir. 1988).
25' Id. at 839 (citation ominitted).
2 Id.; see also Bruce A. Green, Whose Rules of Conduct Should Govern Lnwyers in Federal Court
and How Should the Rules Be Created?, 64 GEO. WASH. L REV. 460. 473 (1996) (discussing the
Hammad case).
Z8 See MOSES MAIMONIDES, MaisHNEH TORAH, Sanhedrin 24:4. at 73 (outlining the concept of
placing a fence around the law by means of extralegal sanctions).
29 See id.
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rails around the abyss." ° In other words, zealous enforcement of ethical
rules-which go beyond the minimum protections provided by the Constitu-
tion-can prevent even accidental unconstitutional conduct and can further
serve to prevent prosecutors and defense attorneys from entering the gray ar-
eas of doubtful constitutionality.' In keeping with this legal concept, federal
courts have held that suppression of evidence may be appropriate, at least un-
der certain circumstances, in cases where ethical rules are violated. 6 Moreo-
ver, violation of an ethical rule might result in a direct sanction of an attorney,
up to and including disbarment.m
Three ethical rules are especially applicable to the problem of criminal de-
fense attorneys who inform against their clients. First, Disciplinary Rule 1-
102(A)(4) of the ABA Model Code of Professional Responsibility-the foun-
dation of many state ethical codes2--provides that a lawyer shall not
"[e]ngage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresenta-
tion."' In addition, the Model Code provides that an attorney must inform
his client prior to disclosing any confidential information.26 Finally, attorneys
267are required to report instances of unethical conduct by other attorneys.
The interplay between these rules creates obligations for both prosecutors
and defense attorneys in potential lawyer-informant situations. Disciplinary
Rules 1-102(A)(4) and 4-101(B)(3), when read together, preclude defense at-
torneys from misrepresenting their relationship with the government to their
clients and from disclosing privileged information to the government without
the consent of the client.6 Moreover, the obligation to report unethical con-
duct by other attorneys creates an obligation on the part of prosecutors to in-
form state disciplinary agencies of the activities of defense attorneys who seek
2W Richard John Neuhaus, The Way They Were, The Way We Are: Bioethics and the Holocaust,
FIRST THiNGS, Mar. 1990, at 34.
261 See ad; see also 6 ENCYCLOPEDIA JUDAICA 40 (1971) (describing the system of dietary rules de-
veloped by rabbinical authorities to prevent deliberate or accidental transgression of the law of the To-
rah). In addition, the concept of "placing a fence around the law" has been explicitly endorsed by fed-
eral courts in connection with certain areas affecting the integrity of the judicial system. See Davis v.
Xerox, 811 F.2d 1293, 1294-95 (9th Cir. 1987) (stating that the rule requiring judges to recuse them-
selves when they have even a slight pecuniary interest in the outcome of a case is designed to place a
fence around the Constitution by eliminating all possible temptation for judges to rule in their own self-
interest and to enhance the perceived integrity of the judicial system).
22 See United States v. Hammad, 858 F.2d 834, 840-42 (2d Cir. 1988) (stating that suppression of
evidence is a permissible, although not a mandatory, consequence of the government's violation of DR
7-104).
23 See supra notes 36-46 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., N.Y. COMP . CODES R. & REGS. tit. § 1200.3 (1999) ("A lawyer or law firm shallnot... [e]ngage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation.").
DR 1-102(A)(4).
See DR 4-101(B)(3).
267 See DR 1-103(A).
us The defendant in Sabri claimed that the conduct of his attorney violated DR 4-101. See United
States v. Sabri, 973 F. Supp. 134, 145 n.10 (W.D.N.Y. 1996). However, since the record was inade-
quate to determine the applicability of this rule, the court denied the defendant's motion without preju-
dice to renew at a later time. Id. In addition, the Sabri court denied without prejudice the defendant's
motion to dismiss based on ABA Formal Opinion 337, which prohibits the recording of conversations
by attorneys unless all participants are notified. Id.
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to inform on their clients.
In the Sabri decision, the Western District of New York identified addi-
tional rules that might be applicable to cases involving 
attorney-informants. =9
Specifically, the court noted that Disciplinary Rule 7-101(A)(3) "requires a
lawyer to represent a client zealously and prohibits [her] from causing 'preju-
dice or damage' to [her] client' unless the client has made non-privileged dis-
closures indicating that she has perpetrated a crime or fraud.
tm In its analysis,
the court noted that "[t]o go beyond mere disclosure... and to use the attor-
ney-client relationship to investigate the client" oversteps the bounds of per-
missible conduct under this rule and compromises the attorney's responsibil-
ity to represent her client zealously.2'
Moreover, the Sabri court gave "teeth" to this rule by holding that a vio-
lation thereof may result in suppression of evidence or even dismissal of an
indictment.2n Reasoning that the disciplinary rules were "designed to safe-
guard the integrity of the profession and preserve public confidence in our
system of justice[,]" the court found that use of attorney-informants could
have profound negative effects on the integrity of the judicial system if left
unsanctionedtm Accordingly, the court suppressed the results of the defen-
dant's conversation With his attorney that were recorded after she became a
government informant! 4
In addition, the disciplinary rules may provide a more direct sanction
against the use of attorney-informants, by subjecting prosecutors and defense
attorneys who engage in unethical conduct to censure, suspension or disbar-
ment. 5 The disciplinary rules have been used effectively against at least one
defense attorney, who was disbarred for his unethical behavior in informing
See iU. at 145-46.
I& at 145 (quoting DR 7-101(A)(3); DR 7-102(B)).
2d l. In addition, while not deciding the issue, the court noted that "a strong case can be m:-* that
the spirit, if not the letter, of DR 5-101(C), DR 5-102 and DR 5-105 may have been violated." Id. at
145 n.11. These rules provide that a lawyer shall not accept employment if it is obvious that he will be
called as a witness adverse to his client, that he should withdraw if it becomes obvious that he will be
called as such a witness at a later time, and that he shall not continue multiple employment if a client
will be adversely affected. See iU. While the Sabri court acknowledged that "the language of these
provisions appear[s] to restrict their application to situations in which a lawyer is representing a client
as an advocate in front of a court or tribunal; or where a lawyer is representing two clients," it noted
that "[i]n spirit.., it seems that each of these provisions seeks to prohibit a lawyer from continuing to
represent an individual once a conflict of interest between the lawyer and the client arises." Il Thus.
"[b]y continuing to represent the defendant, and by expressly using the attorney-client relationship to
obtain further evidence to be used against the defendant in a criminal prosecution, (attorney) Crogan-
Mazur may well have violated these provisions." ld.
2 2 See id. at 145-46 (stating that, despite lack of authority precisely on point. "suppression of evi-
dence based upon a violation of DR 7-101 is consistent with the Second Circuit's rationale in Ham-
mad. ...").
2' Id. at 146 (stating that, if use of attorney-informants were allowed, the government might enlist
an attorney for a business engaged in civil litigation with a competitor to investigate possible violations
of antitrust laws or recruit an attorney representing a taxpayer in litigation against the IRS to investigate
potential criminal tax evasion charges).
2 See id.
275 See Mullen v. Canfield, 105 F.2d 47, 48 (D.C. Cir. 1939) (stating that any court that has the
power to admit attorneys to practice also has the inherent power to censure, suspend or disbar them for
unprofessional conduct).
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on his clients 76 Application of these ethical standards to prosecutors, how-
ever, is made more difficult by the Department of Justice's "Thornburgh
Rule," which allows federal grosecutors to ignore the ethical rules of the
states in which they practice. The Thornburgh Rule has, in practice, al-
lowed federal prosecutors to collaborate in unethical conduct by defense at-
torneys without fear of sanction by state disciplinary authorities. This practice
is especially disturbing given that, discipline for ethical violations is often the
only meaningful direct sanction available against prosecutors,7' due to their
far-ranging immunity from civil suits for damages due to unconstitutional
conduct. 79
There are several methods to overcome this obstacle. First, numerous
federal courts have adopted state disciplinary rules as local rules of court, to
which federal prosecutors as well as defense attorneys are subjectY.2  A sec-
ond and more comprehensive solution, however, is provided by the Citizens'
Protection Act of 1998."'
This act, which was drafted to curb abuses by federal prosecutors, was
passed by a wide bipartisan margin of 345-82 in the House of Representa-
tives.m In addition to abolishing the Thornburgh Rule, the Act created an in-
dependent board to oversee the ethics of federal prosecutors and to require the
Justice Department's Office of Professional Responsibility to investigate and
punish ethical abuses by Assistant United States Attorneys."3 However, all
these provisions other than abolition of the Thornburgh Rule were effectively
nullified by the 1998 House appropriations bill, which contained no funding
for the independent review board or for additional investigatory personnel
within the Office of Professional Responsibility.2 Moreover, even though
the abolition of the Thornburgh Rule remained intact, the Justice Department
was given six months to come into compliance, and has used much of the in-
tervening time to lobby for repeal of the Act. 25
Congress took a major step toward remedying prosecutorial intrusion into
the attorney-client relationship by enacting the Citizens' Protection Act. Even
without the remaining provisions, the abolition of the Thornburgh Rule will
restore much-needed honesty to the Justice Department's conduct in criminal
investigations. However, the legislature must act further to restore and fully
fund an enhanced Office of Professional Responsibility and an independent
276 See supra notes 38-46 and accompanying text.
2" See supra notes 111-14 and accompanying text.278 See Stem & Hoffman, supra note 5, at 1817 (stating that "enforcement of the applicable discipli-
nary rules provides one of the few mechanisms available to ensure that prosecutors live up to their pro-
fessional duties").
n9 See Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430-31 (1976) (outlining nearly absolute prosecutorial
immunity in civil rights suits for damages).
See, e.g., United States v. Marshank, 777 F. Supp. 1507, 1530 (N.D. Cal. 1991).
2 See Moushey, supra note 108, at Al.
n See id.
283 See id.
2U See i.
2 See id.
[Vol. 2:3
TRAITORS IN OUR MIDST
ethical review board.2 Both of these are ultimately necessary to safeguard
the constitutionally protected attorney-client relationship-the first because it
would create the possibility of meaningful and uniformly-applied sanctions
for unethical conduct, and the second because it would apply a fresh perspec-
tive to a law enforcement agency that has become dominated by the percep-
tion that "whatever works is all right."27
VI. CONCLUSION
In the past ten to fifteen years, the use of criminal defense attorneys as in-
formants against their clients has become more and more widespread. This
practice has its roots in several larger trends in the criminal justice system, in-
cluding the increasing number of defense attorneys who are themselves under
criminal investigation and the growing tendency of prosecutors to use high-
pressure tactics and to view the defense bar as criminals rather than col-
leagues. Moreover, despite their verbal condemnation of this practice, the
courts' weak response has had the effect of enabling prosecutors to use attor-
ney-informants with immunity.
In order to curtail this problem, a comprehensive solution is necessary that
involves judicial, ethical and criminal sanction. Many of the elements of this
solution could be achieved by creative use of current law, such as the applica-
tion of the Cuyler conflict of interest doctrine to attorney-informants. Other
elements could be achieved by legal reforms similar to the abortive Citizens'
Protection Act, which impose stem ethical obligations on prosecutors to dis-
courage unethical conduct on the part of defense attorneys. Finally, still other
elements could be achieved by judicial re-examination of such doctrines as
the outrageous government conduct defense s and the proper standard of
prejudice applicable to claims of ineffective assistance of counsel.
While some of these reforms may be far-reaching, they are nevertheless
vitally necessary to the maintenance of a vigorous criminal defense bar. The
strength of the criminal defense bar is one of the fundamental foundations of
the adversarial justice system, without which many or even most of the other
rights afforded to the accused are meaningless.2 Accordingly, it is necessary
for all parties involved in the criminal justice system-the courts, the legisla-
ture, law enforcement agencies and disciplinary boards-to act in order to en-
sure that the constitutional right to a vigorous and uncompromised defense is
preserved.
In certain egregious circumstances, criminal sanction for obstruction of justice under 18 U.S.C. §
1503 may even be appropriate.
Prosecution or Persecution, supra note 109, at B2.
Us See supra notes 190-205 and accompanying text for a discussion of the outrageous govement
conduct defense.See supra Part IV.
M Se4 e.g., People v. White, 436 N-..2d 507, 509-10 (1986) (noting that. since ceutain constitu-
tional rights including due process of law and protection against self-incrimination are not self-
executing, the right to counsel is necessary to safeguard their vitality); People v. Garofolo. 389 N._.2d
123, 126 (1979) (same).
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